New Side Channel Attack Countermeasure Based on Minimal Hamming Weight Distribution (Mathematical Foundation of Algorithms and Computer Science) by Suppakitpaisarn, Vorapong & Edahiro, Masato
Title
New Side Channel Attack Countermeasure Based on Minimal
Hamming Weight Distribution (Mathematical Foundation of
Algorithms and Computer Science)
Author(s)Suppakitpaisarn, Vorapong; Edahiro, Masato




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
New Side Channel Attack Countermeasure
Based on Minimal Hamming Weight Distribution
Vorapong Suppakitpaisarn * \dagger Masato Edahiro \ddagger
22 6 9
ditions [8], making the point additions and point
doubles indistinguishable [9], or group some point
To cope with the side channel attack, many works additions and point doubles into indistinguishable
have been proposed. In this paper, we are inter- blocks [10]. Each scheme has its own advantages
ested in the method of varying the representation and disadvantages. For instances, the dummy ad-
of the scalar. By using this method, we have to in- ditions are easy to implement, but its efficiency is
crease the hamming weight of the representation. poor, and it is weak against the fault analysis at-
This makes the computation time of the scalar- tack [11]. The indistinguishable operation and the
point multiplication of the elliptic curve cryptosys- indistinguishable block are strong against most of
tem increases. In this paper, we improve the ham- attacks, but the implementation is hard. It is dif-
ming weight of the randoinized binary expansion, ficult to apply the idea to the different type of the
and inake the hamming weight fixed for any scalars. elliptic curve, or the differeiit scalar representation.
This is done by utilizing the fact that the distri- In this paper, we are interested in the method
butions of the minimal hamming weight are the that varying the representation of the scalar. As
standard distributions for any binary expansions. representing the number using a redundant digit set
As a result, our proposed expansion is randomized is intensively used for improving the computation
expansion as in the work by Ha and Moon [1, 2], time of the scalar-point multiplication, it is also
It has a fixed hamming weight as in the work $\text{ _{}J}y$ able to be used for preventing the side channel at-
Mamiya and Miyaji [3]. And, it improves the av- tack. Since one scalar can be represented by many
erage hamming weight on both papers from 0.50 expansions, randoinly selected one representation
to 0.43. Our method can be applied to the multi- can make the eavesdropper harder to get any infor-
scalar point multiplication, and the scalar point ma.tion. The first work on this scheme is done by Ha
multiplication on the enlarged digit set. and Moon $[$ 1, 2]. They propose the randomized ex-
pansion on digit set $\{0, \pm 1\}$ . Although, their works
have been proved to be weak against many attacks
1 ,Introduction or implementation environments [12, 13, 14], it is
still intensively used. This is because of the fact
Side channel attack [4] is the utilization of the that the implementation is not very hard, and in-
cryptographic environment to break the cryptosys- dependent to the type of the curve. However, the
tem. These include the computation time [5], the binary expansion proposed in [1, 2] has the average
power consumption [6], or the EM wave transmit- hamming weight equals to $\frac{1}{2}=0.50$ . This is much
ted from the cryptosystem [7]. This method is higher than the minimal average hamming weight
shown that it can be used for breaking the scalar that is equal to $-\approx 0.33$ . We note that this num-
point multiplication in the elliptic curve cryptosys- ber affects the number of point additions needed
tem that utilizes the double-and-add method. This for the scalar-point multiplication.
is because of the fact that the power consumption Proposed in [3], the fixed-hamming-weight repre-
using for point additions and point doubles are dif- sentation is important to prevent the timing attack,
ferent. Also, the time used on point additions de- especially for the case that the point additions and
pends on the hainming weight, the number of non- the point doubles are indistinguishable. They also
zero digit on the expansion of the scalar. Many propose the conversion to make the representation
works have been proposed to cope with this prob- by $\{0, \pm 1\}$ has the fixed hamming weight. That.
lem. These include inserting the dummy point ad- fixed hamming weigbt is $\frac{1}{2}=0.50$ . Similar to the
work by Ha and Moon, this makes the operation
Graduate School of Information Scicncc and Tcchnology, slower. Although the lninimal average hain $1\eta|ng$Thc Univcrsity of Tokyo
\dagger ERATO-SOHST Quantum ComPutation and Informa- weight is $\frac{1}{3}\approx 0.33$ , the worst minimal hamming
tion Projcct, IST weight is $\frac{1}{2}=0.50$ . Then, it is hard to reduce the
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tion
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In this work, we apply the minimal weight dis-
tribution to improve this problem. We prove that
the distribution of the minimal weight is always
a normal distribution, for any binary expansions.
This results is not only limited to a single integer,
but also a pair, a triple, or larger number of inte-
gers. This fact is obtained by analyzing the Markov
chain proposed for automatically finding the aver-
age hamming weight on any expansions on our pre-
vious work [15, 16]. In this analysis, we are also
able to find the expected value and the standard
deviation of the distribution. As a results, we know
that more than 97.73% of the single scalar has the
minimal weight in the digit set $\{0, \pm 1\}$ less than
0.43 when the length of bit string is 160. Then, we
propose not to use the scalar which has the weight
more than 0.43 as a key, and we randomly increase
the weight of the scalar which has the weight less
than that number. This idea makes us able to pro-
duce the randomized representation which has the
fixed hamming weight equals to 0.43. As this work
is still on-going, our expansion has not been en-
sured whether it is strong against the attacks. But,
we believe that it is stronger than the work by Ha
and Moon.
This paper is organized as follows: On next sec-
tion, we review the concepts about the scalar-point
multiplication. We also describe our method to find
the average weight on any digit sets. In Section 3,
we describe how our model can be used for proving
that the minimal hamming weight distribution is
minimal. Also, we explain how to find the standard
deviation from the model. In Section 4, we discuss
how to apply the minimal weight distribution to
the side channel attack countermeasure. And, we




Scalar-point multiplication is the operation to
compute
$S=rP$,
when $r$ is a natural number, and $P$ is a point in the
elliptic curve.
Using the double-and-add method, we can com-
pute the operation efficiently. For example,
$S=14P=(1110)_{2}P$
can be computed by
$S=2(2(2P+P)+P)$ .
This needs 3 point doubles and 2 point additions.
The number of point doubles required is constantly
equal to $\lfloor\log_{2}r\rfloor$ . And, the number of point addi-
tions required is equal to $W_{bin}(r)-1$ , when $W_{bin}(r)$
is the hamming weight of $r$ in the binary represen-
tation.
In some elliptic curves, the point inversions can
be done easily. Then, representing the number us-
ing the digit set $\{0, \pm 1\}$ can improve the scalar-
point multiplication. For example,
$S=14P=(100\overline{1}0){}_{2}P$,
when $\overline{1}=-1$ , can be computed by
$S=2(2(2(2P))-P)$ .
This needs 4 point doubles and 1 point addi-
tion. Although, the number of point doubles some
times increases by 1, the number of point addi-
tions usually decrease significantly. There is the
work [17, 18] presented the minimal expansion on
this representation. They call the representation as
NAF.
To evaluate the representation $E$ , we use the av-
erage weight
$AW(E)=k arrow\infty 1i_{l}n\sum_{r=0}^{2^{\lambda}}\frac{W_{E}(r)}{k2^{k}}$ .
For examples,
$AW$ (bin) $= \frac{1}{2}=0.50$ ,
$AW(NAF)= \frac{1}{3}\approx 0.33$ .
The generalized version of NAF representing by the
digit set $\{0, \pm 1, \ldots, \pm(2^{w}-1)\}$ is called w-NAF.
It is proved that $AW(w-NAF)= \frac{1}{w+2}[19]$ .
Next, we consider the multi-scalar point multi-
plication
$S=r_{1}P_{1}+\cdots+r_{d}P_{d}$ ,
which is used for elliptic curve digital signature al-
gorithm [20]. Instead of computing $r_{1}P,$ $\ldots$ , $r_{d}P_{d}$
in separate, Shamir’s trick can make the operation
faster. For example, let $d=2$ ,
$r_{1}=12=(10\overline{1}00)_{2}$ ,
$r_{2}=21=(10101)_{2}$ .
And, we precompute $D_{1}=P_{1}+P_{2},$ $D_{2}=P_{1}-P_{2}$ .
We can compute $S=12P_{1}+21P_{2}$ as
$S=2(2(2(2D_{1})-D_{2}))+P_{2}$ .
This requires 4 point doubles and 2 point additions.
Similar to the scalar point multiplication, the num-
ber of point doubles required is
$\max_{c}(\lfloor\log_{2}(r_{c})\rfloor)$ .
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And the number of point addition required is equal
to $JW_{E}(r_{1}, . , r_{d})$ - 1. $JW_{E}(r_{1}, , r_{d})$ is the joint
hamming weight of $r_{1}$ , , $r_{d}$ in the representation
$E$ ,
$JW_{E}$ $(r_{1}, r_{d})=$ I $\{c\in \mathbb{Z}|E_{c}(r_{1}, r_{d})\neq\langle 0\rangle\}||$,
when $E_{c}(r_{1}, . . , r_{d})$ is $\langle\alpha_{t}\rangle_{t=1}^{d}$ . $\alpha_{t}$ is the $c^{th}$ bit
when expand $r_{t}$ in the representation $E$ .
We also define the average joint weight $AJW(E)$
as
$AJW(E)= \lim_{karrow\infty}\sum_{r_{1}=0}^{2^{k}}$ $\sum_{r_{d}=0}^{2^{\Lambda}}\frac{JW_{E}(r_{1},.,r_{d})}{k2^{dk}}$ .
It is obvious that $AJW(bin)=0.75$ . Solinas [21]
propose the minimal weight representation for the
digit set $\{0, \pm 1\},$ $d=2$ , and call the proposal as
$JSF$ . He can prove that $AJW(JSF)=0.50$ .
2.2 Average Weight on Any Expan-
sions
In [15, 16], we discuss the method for finding
the minimal average joint weight for any binary
expansion. Most of the inethods proposed in the
literatures are focusing on finding the mathemati-
cal construction of the representation. Then, they
analyze that the construction and find the minimal
average weight. The advantage of this method is
that they can derive the efficient conversion algo-
rithm from the construction. But, the construction
is hard to be found in some representations. For
instance, there is still no work able to $fi_{11}d$ the av-
erage joint hainming weight of the representation
of the digit set $\{0, \pm 1, \pm 3\}$ when $d\geq 2$ . Instead
of finding the mathematical construction, we pro-
pose the conversion algorithm that can be applied
to any digit sets. Then, we construct the analysis
automatically from the conversion algorithm. Algo-
rithm 1 shows the ininimal weight conversion froin
$r_{1}$ , , $r_{d}$ to our representation. We call our min-
imal weight representation as $MIN\{Ds, d\}$ , when
$Ds$ is the desired digit set, and $d$ is the number of
scalars in the scalar point multiplication. We as-
sume that $\max_{i}\log_{2}(r_{?})=n$ . We prove that this
algorithm is the minimal weight conversion in [15],
From Algorithm 1, we propose Algo-
rithm 2 to construct the Markov chain
$A$ $=$ $(Q_{A}, \Sigma, \sigma_{A}. I_{A}, P_{A})$ , where QA is the set
of states, $\Sigma$ is the set of alphabet, $\sigma_{A}$ is the set of
transition, $I_{A}$ is the initial possibility, and $P_{A}$ is
the transition possiblity. We consider Algorithin
1 Lines 5-20 as a function which $\Lambda fW$ outputs
$w$ . The input of the function is $bin_{i}(r_{1}, . , r_{d})$
and $lw$ . We note that we do not consider $lQ$ and
$Q$ here, as we are considering only the minimal
weight not the solution. This function is referred
in Line 9 of Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 Minimum joint weihMii ight conversion to
$\frac{anydigitsetsDsinthebinaryexpansion}{Require:r_{1},.,r_{d}}$
The desired digit set $Ds$
Ensure: $MIN\{Ds, d\}(r_{1}, , r_{d})$
1: Let $Cs$ be a carry set such that for all $c\in Cs$
and $d\in Ds,$ $\frac{c+d}{2},$ $\frac{c+d+1}{2}\in Cs$ .
We discuss the construction of $Cs$ in [15].
2: Let $lw$ be an array of $lw_{c_{1}\ldots.,cd}$ for any
$c_{1},$ $\ldots,$
$c_{d}\in Cs$ .
$lw_{c_{1},\ldots,c_{d}}arrow 0$ if $\langle c_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $c_{d}\rangle=\langle 0,$ $\ldots,$ $0\rangle$ .
$lw_{c_{1}\ldots.,c_{d}}arrow\infty$ otherwise.
3: Let $lQarrow\langle lQ_{p_{:}c_{1},\ldots,c_{d}}\rangle$ for any $1\leq p\leq d$ and
$c_{1},$ $\ldots,$
$c_{d}\in Cs$ . All $lQ_{p,c_{1Cd}}\ldots.$. are initiate to a
null string.
4: for $iarrow n-1$ to $0$ do
5: for all $G=\langle g_{i})_{i=1}^{d}\in Cs^{d}$ do
6: $aearrow bin_{i}(r_{1}, \ldots, r_{d})+G$
7: for all $e=.\langle e_{t}\rangle_{i=1}^{d}\in Ds^{d}$ do
8: if $2|(ae_{p}-e_{p})$ for alll $\leq p\leq d$ then
9: $CA arrow\langle\frac{ae-e}{2}\rangle_{t=1}^{d}$












19: $Q_{s,G}arrow\langle lQ_{s.CE},$ $ea_{s}\rangle$ for all $1\leq s\leq d$
20: end for
21: $lwarrow w,$ $lQarrow Q$
22: end for
23: Let $Zarrow\langle 0\rangle$ .
$\Lambda f$IN$\{Ds, d\}$ $(r_{1}, . , r_{d})arrow\langle Q_{i.Z}\rangle_{\tau=1}^{d}$
Let $C$ be a number of states. We number each
state $d\in Q_{\mathcal{A}}$ as $d_{i}$ where $1\leq i\leq C$ . Let $\pi^{t}=(\pi_{i}^{t})$
be a probablistic distribution at time $t$ , i.e. $\pi_{i}^{t}$ is
the possibility that we are on state $d_{1}$ after received
input length $t$ . Next, let $P=(P_{ij})$ be the transition
matrix such that
$P_{ij}= \sum_{G\in 1_{d}^{\backslash }}P_{A}(i, G_{1}j)$ .
Without loss of generality, assume $d_{1}=lwI$ , then
$\pi^{0}=(1,0, \ldots,0)^{t}$ . From the equation $\pi^{t+1}=\pi^{t}P$ ,
we find the stationary distribution such that $\pi^{t+1}=$
$\pi^{t}$ by the eigendecomposition.
The next step is to find the average weiglit froni
the stationary distribution $\pi$ . Define $WK$ as a func-
tion from $\sigma_{A}$ to the set of integer by
$WK(lw1, G, lw2)=lw2_{0}-lw1_{0}$
or the change of the hamming weight in the case
that carry pair is $\langle 0\rangle$ . We compute the average
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Algorithm 2 Construct the Markov chain used for
finding the average miiiimal weight and the minimal
weight distribution
Require: The digit set $Ds$
The number of scalars $d$
Ensure: Markov chain $A=(Q_{A}, \Sigma, \sigma_{A}, I_{A}, P_{A})$
1. $\Sigmaarrow\{0,1\}^{d},$ $Q_{A}arrow\copyright_{)}\sigma_{A}arrow\emptyset$
2: The carry set $Cs$ is the same as the carry set
in Algorithm 1.
3: $lwIarrow\langle lwI_{c_{1}\ldots..c_{d}}\rangle_{c_{1}\ldots..c_{d}\in Cs}$ , where
$lwI_{0,\ldots,0}arrow 0$ and $lwI_{c_{1}\ldots.,c_{d}}arrow\infty$ otherwise
4: $Quarrow\{lwI\}$
5: while $Qu\neq\emptyset$ do
6: let $x\in Qu$
7: $lwarrow x,$ $Quarrow Qu-lw$
8: for all $bin_{i}(r_{1}, \ldots, r_{d})\in L^{\backslash }$ do
9: $warrow MW(bin_{i}(r_{1}, \ldots, r_{d}), lw)$
10: $\sigma_{A}arrow\sigma_{A}\cup\{(lw,$ $bin_{i}(r_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $r_{d}),$ $w)\}$
11: $P_{A}(lw, bin_{i}(r_{1}, \ldots, r_{d}), w)arrow\frac{1}{|\Sigma|}$






lS: $I_{A}(lw)arrow 1$ if $lw=lwI,$ $I_{A}(lw)arrow 0$ otherwise.
Lemma 3.1. Let $X_{1},$ $X_{2},$ $\ldots,$ $X_{n}$ be an indepen-
dent trials process and let $S_{n}=X_{1}+X_{2}+\cdot\cdot+X_{n}$ .
Assume that the greatest common divisor of the dif-
ferences of all the values that the $X_{j}$ can take on is
1. Let $E(X_{j})=\mu$ and $V(X_{j})=\sigma^{2}$ . Then,
$\lim_{narrow\infty}Pr(S_{n}=j)=\frac{\phi(x_{j})}{\sqrt{n\sigma^{2}}}$ ,
where $x_{j}= \frac{j-n\mu}{\sqrt{n\sigma^{2}}}$ , and $\phi(x)$ is the standard normal
density.
Then, we prove the theorem
Theorem 3.2. The distribution of the joint ham-
ming weight of $MIN\{Ds, d\}$ produced by Algonthm
1 is the normal distribution.
Proof. Let $X$ be a random variable which is equal
to the joint hamming weight increases by one step
of the Markov chain constructed in Algorithm 2.
Hence, let
$C_{t}= \{x\in Q_{A}|\sum_{G\in\Sigma y\in Q_{A}}\frac{WK(x,G,y)}{|L^{\backslash }|}=t\}$ ,
$Pr(X=t)=\sum_{x\in C_{t}}\pi_{x}$ .
hamming weight by the average value of the change This means $Pr(X=t)$ is the possibility that the
in the hamming weight when $n$ is increased by 1 in Markov chain is on the state which will increase the
the stationary distribution formalized as joint hamming weight by $t$ in the next step. Since
the function $WK$ always returns a finite integer,
$AJW(MIN\{Ds, d\})=$ $\sum$ $\frac{\pi_{x}WK(x,G,y)}{|\Sigma|}$ the set of the possible values of $t$ is also finite. We
show the probability density function of $X$ when
$(x,G.y)\in\sigma_{A}$
$d=2$ and $Ds=\{0, \pm 1\}$ in Table 1, and when
By using this method, we can find the average $d=2$ and $Ds=\{0, \pm 1, \pm 3\}$ in Table 2.
joint hamming weight of many digit sets. These Let $X_{i}$ be the joint hamming weight increases in
include step $i$ . The joint hamming weight of the bit string
in the binary expansion length $n,$ $S_{n}$ , is $\sum_{i=0}^{n-1}X_{i}$ .281
$AJW(MIN\{\{0, \pm 1, \pm 3\}, 2\}=$ – $\approx 0.3575$ , Then, $S_{n}$ satisfies Lemma 3.1, aitd the distribution
786 of $S_{n}$ , the joint hamming weight, is normal. $\square$
$AJW( \Lambda lIN\{\{0, \pm 1, \pm 3, \pm 5\}, 2\}=\frac{1496369}{4826995}\approx 0.3100$ .
$\not\equiv K1$ : The probability density function of the
joint hamming weight increases in one step in the3 Minimal Weight Distribu- Markov chain when $Ds=\{0, \pm 1\},$ $d=2$
tion Value Probability
$\overline{- 0.250.25}$
3.1 Proof of Normal Distribution 0.25 0.125
0.5 0.125In this section, we prove that the distribution of 0.75 0.25the joint hamming weight is the normal distribu- 1 0.125tion. This generalizes a proof which shows that 125 0.125JSF is the normal distribution proposed by Grab-
ner, Heuberger, and Prodinger [22]. Also, our proof
generalizes the proof that the window-JSF is the
normal distribution [23].
Here, we refer to the approximation theorem,
Theorem 9.3 of [24].
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3.2 Finding the Standard Deviation
$g3$ : The standard deviation of the joint hamming




MIN $\{\{0, \pm 1\}, 2\}$ 0.$0400n$
$MIN\{\{0, \pm 1, \pm 3\}, 2\}$ 0.$0370n$
As the bit length increases, the standard devia-
tion becomes smaller compared to $n$ . For example,
in $MIN\{\{0, \pm 1\}, 2\}$ , the standard deviation when
$n=100$ is $5.05=0.0505n$ , and when $n=160$ the
standard deviation is $6.40=0.0400n$ . We show the
standard deviation of some representations when
$n=160$ in Table 3.
In this subsection, we continue the proof from the
previous subsection to find the standard deviation
of the distribution.
Corollary 3.3. Refer to the random variable $X$
defined in the proof of Theorem 3.2, let
$V(X)= \sum_{t}t^{2}Pr(X=t)-AJW(MIN\{Ds, d\})^{2}$
The variance of the joint hamminq weight distnbu-
tion is $nV(X)$
Proof. Let the expectation value is $\mu$ and the stan-
dard deviation is $\sigma$ . The probability density func-
tion of the normal distribution is
$Pr(X=d)=\frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}}\exp(-\frac{(x-\mu)^{2}}{2\sigma^{2}})$ .
And, the probability density function of the stan-




Then, by $x_{j}= \frac{j-n\mu}{\sqrt n\sigma^{2}}$ ,
$\lim_{narrow\infty}Pr(S_{n}=j)=\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\uparrow?\sigma^{2}}}\exp(-\frac{(j-n\mu)^{2}}{21?\sigma^{2}})$ .
Hence, the distribution of thejoint hamming weight
is the normal distribution where the expectation
value is $nE(X)$ and the variance is $nV(X)$ . $\square$
$V(X)$ is the constant value for the specific $re$ }$>$
resentation. Then, the variance of the joint ham.
ming weight representation depends on $n$ . Hence
the standard deviation, $\sqrt{nV(X)}$ , depends on $\sqrt{n}$
4 Application to Side Channel
Attack
The result that the hamming weight distribution
is the normal representation on the previous section
can be used for presenting the countermeasure of
the side channel attack. In this section, we present
how to make the random representation which the
hamining weight is fixed from that fact.
Here, we present Algorithm 3 to improve the pro-
posals by Ha, Moon, Mamiya, and Miyaji. The
algorithm is described as follows:. We select the random number $k$ in Line 2,
and convert this number to the expansion
$MIN\{Ds, d\}(k)$ at Line 3. If its weight is more
than $\mu+\alpha\sigma$ , we reject the random number $k$ ,
and pick a new random number. As the ham-
ining weight distribution is a normal distribu-
tion, the positive real number $\alpha$ determine the
proportion of an integer $k$ that can be used
in our algorithm. If $\alpha=2$ , 97.73% of the set
$\mathbb{Z}\cap(0,2^{n})$ can be used. If a $=2.5$ , 99.38%
can be used. The fact that we cannot use all
$k$ in the domain is the main drawback of our
algorithin. Selecting appropriate $\alpha$ can trade
off betweeii the proportion of the usable scalar
and the efficiency of the algoritlim.. For example, using $MIN\{\{0, \pm 1\}, 1\}(k)$ when
$n=160$ , the average hamming weight is $\mu=$
$\frac{1}{3}\cross 160\approx 533$ , and the standard deviation is
$\sigma=\sqrt{\frac{7}{18}\cross 160}\approx 7.89$ . If $\alpha=2$ , the fixed
weight is 53 $3+2\cross 789\approx 691$ . If $\alpha=2.5$ , the
fixed weiglit is 53 $3+2.5\cross 7.89\approx 73.0$ . Both
$]$
numbers improve the efficiency of the existing
proposal by Mamiya and Miyaji that the fixed
weight is 80. Also, it improves the work by Ha
and Moon that the average weight is 80.
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. The function CONVERT in Line 5 is defined
in Algorithm 4. It is the algorithm to find the
random representation with a fixed weight. We
note that the function CONVERT defined in
Algorithm 4 is specified for $MIN\{\{0, \pm 1\}, 1\}$
representation, but the algorithm for other
representations can be referred easily.
Algorithm 3$\overline{Our}$proposed countermeasureofOfthe
side channel attack using the random and fixed-
hamming weight representation
Require: a point on the elliptic curve $P$ ,
a bit length $n$ ,
$\mu$ is the average hamming weight of a specific
representation $( \frac{1}{3}n$ when $d=1,$ $Ds=\{0,$ $\pm 1\})$ ,
$\sigma$ is the standard deviation of a specific repre.
sentation $(\sqrt{\frac{7}{18}n}$ when $d=1,$ $Ds=\{0,$ $\pm 1\})$ ,
$\alpha$ is a positive real number
Ensure: A random number $k\in \mathbb{Z}\cap(O, 2^{n})$ ,
a random expansion $RAN\{Ds, d\}(k)$
a point on the elliptic curve $kP$ .
1. repeat
2. Generate a random number $k$
3. Convert $k$ to $MIN\{Ds, d\}(k)$
4: until $JW_{\Lambda JlN\{Ds,d)}(k)\leq\mu+\alpha\sigma$
5: RAN$\{Ds, d\}(k)arrow CONVERT(k,\mu+\alpha\sigma)$
6: Compute $kP$ using the double-and-add method
and $RAN\{Ds, d\}(k)$ .
Algorithm 4 The conversion to the random rep-
resentation with a fixed hamming weight
Require: A key $k\in(0,2^{n})$ ,
an expected hamming weight $\beta$
Ensure: a fixed hamming weight random expan-
sion $RAN\{\{0, \pm 1\}, 1\}(k)$
1. $marrow W_{AtIN\{\{0,\pm 1\},1\}}(k)$
2: Let $P\{i\}$ be a bit string such that
$MIN\{\{0, \pm 1\}, 1\}(k)=\langle P\{i\}\rangle_{i=0}^{m-1}$ ,
where $P\{i\}_{j}$ if $j\neq 0$ , and $P\{i\}_{0}\in\{-1,1\}$ .
3: $V=\langle v_{i}\rangle_{i=0}^{m-1}arrow\langle|P\{i\}|\rangle_{t=0}^{m-1}$
4: Let $U=\langle u_{i}\rangle_{i=0}^{m-1}$ be a random tuple of integers
such that $0\leq u_{i}<v_{i}$ and $\sum u_{i}=\beta-m$
5. for $i=0$ to $m-1$ do











12: RAN$\{\{0, \pm 1\}, 1\}(k)arrow\langle R\{i\}\rangle_{i=0}^{m-1}$
5 Conclusion and Future
Works
Last, we give some explanations of Algorithm 4.. In Line 2, we divide the bit string
$MIN\{\{0, \pm 1\}, 1\}(k)$ , into $m$ bit strings
$\{P\{i\}\rangle_{i=0}^{m-1}$ . For example, $\langle$0,1,0, $-1\rangle$ , which
is $MIN\{\{0, \pm 1\}, 1\}(3)$ , is divided into
$P\{0\}=\langle 0,1\rangle$ and $P\{1\}=\langle 0,$ $-1\rangle$ .. Since our task is to increase the hamming
weight of the expansion, we need to change
some zero bits of each $P\{i\}$ into 1 or-l. In
the algorithm proposed by Ha and Moon, some
$\langle 0,1\rangle$ or $\langle 0,$ $-1\rangle$ is changed to $\langle 1,$ $-1\rangle$ or $\langle-1,1\rangle$
randomly. We propose that $\{0,0,1\rangle$ can be
changed to $\langle 1,$ $-1,$ $-1\rangle$ , and $\langle 0,0,$ $-1\rangle$ can be
changed to $\langle-1,1,1\rangle$ . Moreover,
$\langle 0,0,$ . $.$ $c\rangle=\langle c,$ $-c,$ $\ldots,$ $-c\rangle$ .
In Lines 6-10, we changed the bit string $P\{i\}$ to
the bit string $R\{i\}$ which the hamming weight
is $u_{i}+1$ by the idea stated above.. As the hamming weight of the bit string $R\{i\}$
is $u_{i}+1$ , the hamming weight of the output
RAN$\{\{0, \pm 1\}, 1\}(k)$ is
$\sum_{j=(}^{m-1}W(R\{i\})=\sum_{i=0}^{m-1}(u_{i}+1)=\beta-m+m=\beta$
Our result proposed in this paper is the sub-
sequence of [15, 16]. We use the Markov chain
automatically generated for finding the expected
value of the minimal joint hamming weight of
$MIN\{Ds, d\}$ to find its distribution. As a result,
we show that the distribution is the normal distri-
bution. Then, 97.73% of the scalars used as a key
has the minimal joint hamming weight less than
$\mu+2\sigma$ , when $\mu$ is the average joint weight, and $\sigma$
is the standard deviation. We propose to reject the
scalars that have more weight than that value, and
propose the random and fixed-hamming-weight ex-
pansion. In $MIN\{\{0, \pm 1\}, 1\}$ , we can improve the
result by Mamiya, Miyaji, Ha, and Moon from 0.50
to 0.43.
This result is still on-going because of many rea-
sons. First, Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 scan the
input left-to-right and right-to-left many times. Al-
though, it is negligible if the point double and the
point addition are much slower, it should be im-
proved. Second, the random tuple generated in
Line 3 of Algorithm 4 is very important for securing
the scheme against the side-channel attacks. Uni-
form random might make the scheme weak against
them. And, we need to decide the most suitable
randomization method to cope with the problem.
Last, we need to show that using this scheme is
stronger than the other randomized expansion, in
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the case that the eavesdropper iteratively uses the
same scalar $k$ to get some information.
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